- "Is the risk that great? We've always had this and had zero issues!"
- "I don't believe you. things are just dandy as they always have been!"
- "We're the only ones who know, I accept the risk as it is low"
- etc
- Duration of observation is not enough to come to a meaningful conclusion. Sure, the sun will rise tomorrow. We have about 4.5 billion years of observations to reference and have a well rounded idea on the rate of occurrence for outliers (solar flares going out 1AU is really low but not impossible). This system has been deployed for (lets pretend) two years; of those two years the threat of being exploited as continually rised due to the proliferation of easy tools, malware, and the rise of internet-based crime. Indeed, security as a practice is to control the outliers in a sustained fashion.
- Your observation has blindspots. Chances are that their observations focus on functionality but not on security data. Recon, attempts, or full breaches may have gone unnoticed. This is a tough argument; I'd suggest having data to back you up.
- Risk does not mean what you think it means. The risk may have a low chance of occurrence, yet if it has a high severity then it is debatable that the risk is "high". This is exactly the point that should be persuaded.
What other false arguments exist and how do you battle them?
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